

response

S-8

PERSONNEL SECURITY

1. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROCEDURES AND TIMEFRAMES:

A. Copies of appropriate portions of manuals pertaining to security clearances are attached as Enclosures (1) and (2).

Enclosure (1) Director of Central Intelligence Directive
1/14

Enclosure (2) OPNAVINST 5510.1G, Chapters 21, 22,
23 and 24

B. Breakdown of time it takes to complete the security process, by major components of the process:

(1) Initiation of requests (completing forms, gathering information, mailing, etc.): 2 - 4 weeks

(2) Investigation by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS): 4 - 5 months

(3) Adjudication/notification: 2 - 3 months

(4) Total completion time: 6 - 12 months

2. IMPACT OF SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ON SELECTION PROCESS:

A. Statistics on those not hired (1985 - 1987) because they did not meet security requirements:

<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Not Available	4	3

B. Data on numbers who withdrew their employment application during the security review process (1985 - 1987):

Data Not Available.

3. EXTENT OF IMPACT OF SECURITY PROCESS ON LIFESTYLE/FAMILY ISSUES (Number of staff who cite as their reason for leaving some aspect of the security requirements -- i.e. reinvestigation, family travel limitations, etc. (1985 - 1987):

None.

4. IMPACT OF INVOLUNTARY STAFF SEPARATIONS ON SECURITY:

A. Number of staff removed per year, reasons for removal and security clearance level of those removed (1985 - 1987):

1985

No. Removed: 8

Reason Removed: Performance (6), Excessive Absenteeism (1),
Giving Classified Information to an Un-
authorized source (1)

Levels of Clearance: TS & Below (5)
SCI (3)

1986

No. Removed: 9

Reason Removed: Performance (7), Excessive Absenteeism (1),
Giving Classified Information to an Un-
authorized source (1)

Levels of Clearance: TS & Below (3)
SCI (6)

1987

No. Removed: 11

Reason Removed: Performance (9), Criminal Activity (2)

Levels of Clearance: TS & Below (5)
SCI (6)

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B. Agency policies on assessing the level/type of classified information removed staff have, and whether there is a risk that removed staff will act against the national security interest:

If an employee with sensitive intelligence access were to be removed under other than favorable circumstances, a security risk evaluation would be conducted. That evaluation would encompass a review of the removal circumstances and review of the list of security accesses held. The scope of the category would be assessed as would the potential damage to national security if the information were made available to unauthorized recipients. In view of the wide variety of unique factors envisioned for any such case, each incident would of necessity require individualized handling tailored to specific attendant circumstances.

C. Examples of alternatives other than removal -- for those employees deemed a security risk if separated -- and extent to which agencies use these alternatives:

No examples of alternatives are available because no such action has occurred within NIC as of this date. Should such action be required however, NIC security would work closely with the NIC/Navy civilian personnel office and the JAG office to explore the entire spectrum of alternate options available within DOD/DON frameworks.

5. VIEWS ON THE POLYGRAPHY EXAMINATION AS A SECURITY TOOL:

The Counterintelligence Security Polygraph (CSP) is an additional security tool that enables us to monitor compliance of the special trust that has been given to those who occupy the most sensitive intelligence positions.

The merits of the polygraph as a screening tool are recognized, however its use in evaluating continuous access to sensitive material is of greater value.

The polygraph should be viewed as one of many options available in meeting our security responsibilities.

Suggested literature: DOD Directive 5210.48 (DOD Polygraph Program) and DOD Directive 5210.48R (DOD Polygraph Program).